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INTRODUCTION

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		Soldado de Cuera or leather-jacketed soldier depicting the typical uniform of an eighteenth-century presidial soldier on the northern frontier of New Spain. The thick leather coat offered protection from Indian arrows. (Courtesy, National Park Service, Spanish Colonial Research Center, Albuquerque, New Mexico)

Chapter One
FOR GOD AND KING

—Juan Domínguez de Mendoza, 1683

On a crisp August morning in 1852, Marine T. W. Chandler, head of a military expedition commissioned to survey the international boundary between Mexico and the United States, paused momentarily to view the abandoned ruins of Presidio San Vicente. Perched high upon a gravel mesa overlooking the Río Grande del Norte, the dilapidated fortress, once a bastion of Spanish frontier defense, stood weather-worn and decayed before the party of curious American explorers. In a detailed report to his superiors Chandler described the crumbling structure as "one of the ancient military posts that marked the Spanish rule in this country."

For almost a full decade, Presidio del Paso de San Vicente,1 established in the winter of 1774, played a significant role in the Spanish strategic line of defense imposed against aggressive Indian attacks and foreign intrusion in West Texas. Viewed by these latter-day visitors to Texas in 1852, the presidio evidenced the earliest European attempts to explore and occupy the area that Spanish cartographers labeled the despoblado (uninhabited lands). For more than a century and a half, this parched and unforgiving expanse of Chihuahuan desert, punctuated dramatically by the enormous canyons of the lower Río Grande, represented an almost insurmountable obstacle to Spain's slow but persistent northward advance.2

Following Hernando Cortés's conquest of the Aztecs in 1521, the Spanish empire extended its political tentacles across the Atlantic Ocean into the valley of Mexico. By 1535 Nueva España (Mexico) became the first permanent viceroyalty established in North America. Under the legal authority of the viceroy, the king's direct representative in the New World, Spain underwrote the political organization of its latest colonial acquisition. Although most of the power centered around the viceroy and a judicial tribunal known as the Audiencia, military needs also determined that New Spain be divided into smaller administrative districts each under the supervision of a local governor. While the more settled provinces were clustered around Mexico City, a vast frontier of uncharted desert lay north of the capital. Once firmly established, the royal government wasted no time in turning attention toward the outlying territories in anticipation of expanding Spanish influence throughout the North American continent.

Dreams of increasing the wealth of the empire became the driving force for exploration in earlier years. But Spain's interminable goal to spread Christianity to native inhabitants of the New World assumed increasing importance by the mid-1600s. Imbued with the spirit of conquest and the desire to convert thousands of souls to Catholicism, the Crown sanctioned a flurry of land and sea expeditions, some of which ended in disaster. One such mission, the ill-fated attempt of Pánfilo de Narváez to reach New Spain from the west coast of Florida, resulted in the deaths of the captain and all but four members of his crew. The survivors, Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca and three shipwrecked companions, were washed ashore near present Galveston Island in November 1528. For the next seven years, Cabeza de Vaca and his compatriots lived among the coastal tribes of Texas before attempting a daring overland escape back to Mexico.

In their travels across the Texas plains, these adventurers became the first Europeans to penetrate, albeit marginally, the region of the Big Bend. Traveling west along the banks of the Rio Puerco (Pecos River), which they reached in the summer of 1535, Cabeza de Vaca reportedly crossed the river near present Reagan Canyon, just northeast of Big Bend National Park. While scholars have yet to determine the exact spot at which the party crossed the Pecos, most agree upon the group's point of reentry into Mexico.

Cabeza de Vaca's personal account of the journey says that they crossed into Chihuahua near the confluence of the Rio Grande and the Rio Conchos (Conchos River), which they named La Junta de los Rios (near Presidio, Texas).3 Continuing westward across the Sierra Madre, they encountered Spanish troops who escorted them to San Miguel de Culiacán (in present Sinaloa, Mexico). Months later, the adventurers completed the final leg of their trek, arriving in Mexico City in July 1536. Their epic journey ended, Cabeza de Vaca and his men had successfully traversed the perilous Chihuahuan desert. In doing so, they established the first known overland route into the Río Grande valley.

The stories Cabeza de Vaca and his men told about legendary cities of gold said to be in Texas and present New Mexico prompted official response among Spanish authorities to undertake the exploration of the Río Grande frontier. In 1540 the king sanctioned an official expedition under the command of Francisco Vásquez de Coronado, the governor of Nueva Galicia (Jalisco, Mexico), commissioning him with the discovery of the new kingdoms reported to rival the grandeur of the Aztec empire. Despite a two-year search in which Coronado wandered through much of today's American southwest, he never encountered a second Mexico City. As a result of his failure, the Spanish Crown turned its focus away from Texas and the remainder of the northern frontier for nearly fifty years.4

If the existence of fabulous cities of gold proved to be largely mythical, the discovery of huge deposits of silver near Zacatecas in 1546 was a certified reality. The ensuing "rush" in the mid-1500s provided a much-needed impetus to the northern colonization effort. As the mining towns of Santa Barbara, Parral, Saltillo, and Durango became the instant cities of this remote wasteland, so too did they become the harbingers of European civilization among its inhabitants.

In time the administrative skills of frontier captains like Francisco de Ibarra, first governor of Nueva Vizcaya (Chihuahua, Mexico), and Juan de Oñate, first governor of Nuevo Mexico (New Mexico), brought Hispanic culture face to face with the astringent and inhospitable terrain of the Chihuahuan desert region. By 1580 the limits of Spain's northern frontier were extended from the foothills of the Sierra Madre to the southern extremes of the present north Mexican states of Chihuahua and Coahuila.

The arrival of thousands of miners, merchants, and ranchers to northern Mexico during these years forced the inevitable confrontation between white intruders and native inhabitants. Indian retaliation, in fact, touched off a half-century of conflict known as the War of the Gran Chichimeca (1550 to 1600), named for the plateau country between the eastern and western Sierra Madre ranges where most of the hostility occurred. Spain's efforts to secure the roads and communities of the silver mining region against this new and formidable enemy compelled the government to establish an official military policy for the protection of its citizens along the frontier. The guerrilla tactics of the northern warriors, moreover, required substantial modifications to the Spanish defense system.5

One result of this experimentation was increased utilization of the presidio and the mission. Throughout the remainder of the 1500s, Spanish-Indian diplomacy vacillated between the iron fist concept of all-out warfare and the more conciliatory approach of "peace by purchase." Crucial to the success of the latter policy, the presidio and the mission served as the principal agents of frontier settlement. The presidio, which housed regular soldiers and local militia, assured Spanish colonists some measure of protection against hostile attack. Meanwhile, the mission became the vehicle for the transference of Hispanic culture and European civilization to the native inhabitants. As colonizers pressed increasingly northward toward the Río Grande del Norte, the central government guaranteed their safety through the continuous advancement of these pioneering institutions.6

Expansion of the Mexican mining frontier into the province of Nueva Vizcaya in 1580 prompted a renewed interest in the Río Grande valley. Mining activity necessitated Indian labor not readily accessible among the tribes of northern Mexico. Since the time of Cabeza de Vaca, Spaniards were aware of the large settlements of sedentary Indians living near the junction of the Río Conchos and the Río Grande. Unlike nomadic tribes of the northern frontier, these Indians cultivated crops and lived in well-defined communities. Not surprisingly, mine owners viewed these domesticated Indians as a source of slave labor.

Religious officials, on the other hand, perceived these settlements as targets for Christianization. Intrigued with the prospect of attracting thousands of converts to the Church, Fray Agustin Rodriguez, a zealous Franciscan friar stationed at Valle de San Bartolomé near the mining community of Santa Barbara in present Chihuahua, Mexico, solicited permission from Viceroy Lorenzo Suarez de Mendoza to carry the word of God to these remote northern villages. His request granted in November 1579, Rodriguez solicited the accompaniment of two other Franciscans. In addition, he enlisted the services of a sixty-year-old local miner, Francisco Sanchez Chamuscado, to provide the customary military escort. Together these men prepared to penetrate the westernmost boundary of the Big Bend region for the first time since Cabeza de Vaca's adventure in 1535.

On June 5, 1581, the small band of explorers set out on a northerly course along the banks of the Rio Conchos. They followed the river until reaching the point that Cabeza de Vaca had established as a landmark years before. Here at La Junta de los Rios the party crossed the Rio Grande into Texas. To their surprise, they found both the Patarabuey and Jumano Indians of that region friendly and receptive. The latter informed the Spaniards that three other white men and a black man had passed through their land years ago. The obvious reference to Cabeza de Vaca and his entourage explained, in part, the unexpected welcome of the Rodriguez party among the natives of West Texas.

At this juncture, the Rodriguez-Chamuscado expedition turned northwest following the Rio Grande toward El Paso del Norte (Juárez, Mexico), eventually arriving at the broad, inviting valleys near present Bernalillo, New Mexico.7 The mission ended tragically, however, as Pueblo Indians eventually killed all three of the priests who had elected to remain among them. Meanwhile, Sanchez Chamuscado died of a fever only days short of his arrival back in Santa Barbara.

Upon hearing the news that three Franciscans had been left behind, a rescue expedition prepared to leave Santa Barbara in November 1582. Under the direction of Don Antonio de Espejo, a wealthy cattle rancher and mayor of the neighboring town of Cuatro Cienegas, a complement of fourteen soldiers retraced the steps of the Rodriguez party. "After two days march of five leagues each," Espejo noted in his daily account of the journey, "we found in some rancherías a number of Indians of the Conchos nation, many of whom, to the number of more than a thousand, came out to meet us along the road we were travelling." As the march continued, Espejo estimated that the combined population of five separate pueblos, located near Ojinaga, Chihuahua (across the Rio Grande from Presidio, Texas), numbered upwards of ten thousand inhabitants.

Once arrived in New Mexico, the Espejo party confirmed the rumors that Father Rodriquez and his brethren had in fact been executed. After much debate with the religious members of the expedition, Espejo decided to return to northern Mexico, but this time via West Texas and the territory drained by the Rio Puerco. Arriving within sight of the Davis Mountains, Antonio de Espejo and his men crossed the Rio Puerco near present Fort Stockton on August 8, 1583. The caravan then skirted past present Alpine and Fort Davis as it inched its way through the Chinati Mountains, down Alamito Creek, and back to La Junta de los Rios. After a brief rest, Espejo continued on his trek down the Rio Conchos, arriving in Valle San Bartolomé on September 20, 1583.

	Ruins of Presidio San Vicente as they appeared in 1964. Seen here are the remains of the original chapel walls built in 1774. Note the Sierra del Carmen range in the background. (Courtesy, Archives of the Big Bend, Clifford B. Casey Collection, Sul Ross State University, Alpine, Texas)

While these early expeditions only marginally penetrated Big Bend country, they accomplished two things that were to have long-term significance in the future settlement of that region. First, these ventures established the Rio Conchos as a natural highway for Spain's northward advance to the Rio Grande borderlands. Second, the discovery of large communities of Indians near La Junta de los Rios made that location a primary staging area for missionary efforts into the West Texas region. Nevertheless, Hispanic migration was largely restricted to New Mexico; Texas remained isolated and unsettled for nearly a century. With the advent of French, British, and Russian expansionism, beginning in the late seventeenth century, Spain sharpened its focus on Texas as the front line of defense against foreign intrusion. Correspondingly, the area known today as the Big Bend surfaced as an integral feature of the larger defense strategy of the Spanish empire.8

Perhaps no single event dramatized the flood tide of foreign exploration in America more dramatically than Robert Sieur de La Salle's journey down the Mississippi River in 1682. His establishment of a French outpost near Matagorda Bay two years later, moreover, alerted Spain to the fact that it no longer claimed sole possession of Texas soil. Indeed, the French foothold in the Gulf of Mexico forced a serious reexamination of Spanish attitudes toward that region. Up to now, only El Paso del Norte, which formed part of a tenuous line of communication between the more secure settlements of Nueva Vizcaya and the isolated colony of New Mexico, had been occupied. Spain's initial attempts to occupy East Texas, meanwhile, wavered in the face of increased French encroachment from neighboring Louisiana. Concurrently, nomadic Indians ravaged New Spain's northern borders beginning about 1680.

The combination of these domestic and international events prompted a sense of urgency among Spanish officials to strengthen their defensive position along the Rio Grande.9 In the process, the Big Bend region, quiescent for nearly a century, became the focus of renewed occupation. Explorations began in the fall of 1683 when Jumano chief, Juan Sabeata, wearied from relentless Apache assaults targeted against the villages centered around La Junta de los Rios, led his followers to the Spanish stronghold at El Paso.

Hoping to enter into a formal alliance with Spain to gain protection against the raiders, the Indian leader proclaimed his desire for conversion to Catholicism. Sabeata related an apparition that he interpreted as a symbol of the ultimate triumph of Christianity among his people. This extraordinary pronouncement inspired Father Nicolas Lopez, procurator and custodian of the Franciscan missions of New Mexico, to take action. On December 1, 1683, Father Lopez and two companions, Fathers Juan de Zavaleta and Antonio de Acevado, without the usual military escort, set out for La Junta, where they proceeded to construct the first churches in the Big Bend.10

Two weeks later, Captain Juan Domínguez de Mendoza, a seasoned veteran with over twenty years experience on the northern frontier, followed with the first expedition into the Big Bend for which there is a detailed itinerary. Upon Mendoza's departure for West Texas, the newly appointed governor of New Mexico, Domingo Jironza Petríz de Cruzate, verified the frontier commander's qualifications for the task, noting both the loyalty and the previous accomplishments of the presidial officer. The governor awarded the commission to Mendoza "in consideration of how well he [Mendoza] has served his majesty in the provinces of New Mexico from a very tender age. He was one of those who went to the conquest of New Mexico in the year 1681."

According to royal mandate, the Mendoza expedition had a dual purpose. First, it was ordered to protect all Christianized Indians in Texas against future depredations from raiding Apaches. Second, and perhaps more important to the larger theme of frontier defense, Mendoza had orders to expend every effort to determine if the French were established in Texas.11

On December 15, 1683, Mendoza and a detachment of soldiers set out from Real de San Lorenzo, the principal Spanish settlement established in El Paso. Exactly two weeks later the party reached La Junta de los Rios, which they named La Navidad de las Cruces in honor of the well-placed crosses that greeted them. On his return trip, Mendoza pursued approximately the same course through West Texas that Espejo had followed a century earlier. Once across the Davis Mountains, Mendoza entered the wide valleys near present Alpine, Texas, which he called Los Reyes. On January 13, 1684, the expedition struck the Rio Puerco at Horsehead Crossing, which the captain described in his journal as "muddy and somewhat alkalined, having its source in New Mexico." Here Mendoza met Juan Sabeata, who presented the Spaniard with a French flag, a dramatic confirmation that foreign intruders had presumably penetrated the trans-Pecos region.12

In February of that year, the Mendoza expedition reached the northernmost point of its journey, intercepting the Middle Conchos River where it intersects with the Nueces (near San Angelo, Texas). Changing direction toward the Rio Grande, the expedition terminated its journey through Big Bend country and returned to El Paso on June 4, 1684. Several months later, Mendoza summarized the highlights of the ordeal in a report to the viceroy: "We traveled inland more than three hundred leagues toward the east, undergoing insufferable hardships of hunger and wars which the Indians of the Apache and Salineros nations waged against us." In addition to the setbacks, Mendoza also underscored the successes of his mission: "I took possession of all those lands, giving his majesty a multitude of vassals, because I made seventy-five nations under obedience to him."

Mendoza's efforts in 1683 set into motion a series of formal expeditions into the Big Bend that lasted well into the eighteenth century. Assured that the French threat in the Mississippi valley was real, the Spanish objective in Texas shifted from an exclusively missionary effort to a formalized program of frontier defense. Accordingly, when Juan Domínguez de Mendoza accepted his commission to encounter the French, he also pledged to build two "well fortified presidios in the most suitable location." The presence of these structures, officials believed, would not only provide ample protection against Apache raids on La Junta but also would serve to strengthen Spain's threatened position in West Texas.

There appears to be no record to indicate that Mendoza ever accomplished this task. An ensuing revolt against the missionaries in 1687, furthermore, suggests that the two presidios were probably never constructed. In fact, the missions at La Junta were abandoned entirely until 1714. For this reason the plan to establish a presidial line of defense in Texas assumed equal importance to that of the mission program. In the process, both objectives served as a motivating force for future Hispanic ventures into the trans-Pecos territory.13

The job of revitalizing the missions at La Junta fell to the acting lieutenant general of the governor of Nueva Vizcaya, Juan Antonio Trasvifla Retís. Arriving on May 31, 1715, in Nuestra Señora de Loreto, the first pueblo in La Junta, Trasviña Retís supervised the reconstruction of five small churches. He entrusted the completion of the project to Father Gregorio Osario and Father Juan Antonio Garcia, two Franciscans who had accompanied him, before returning to El Paso. In a subsequent memorandum to the viceroy, Trasviña Retís confirmed the reestablishment of the missions and further suggested that a presidio be erected to ensure their protection. While his recommendation received no immediate response, this early petition for a presidio at La Junta de los Rios was incorporated into a much broader design for a stronger military presence on the Rio Grande frontier.14

As the 1600s drew to a close, Spain's internal provinces counted only twelve presidios—half of them in Nueva Vizcaya (Chihuahua, Mexico), two in Nuevo Mexico (New Mexico) and Nuevo Leon (Mexico), and one each in Sonora and Coahuila. By 1725 that figure nearly doubled with Texas claiming four installations centered mostly around San Antonio and along the Louisiana border. Thus, for almost a quarter of a century, the Spanish line of defense focused principally upon eastern Texas, leaving the western portion virtually unprotected.

Spain's concern for the defense of Texas occasioned Viceroy Juan de Acuña y Béjarano, the Marques de Casafuerte,15 to enlist the services of Brigadier General Pedro de Rivera Villalon, former commandant of San Juan de Ulua, one of Spain's coastal garrisons near Veracruz, Mexico. Rivera was commissioned to inspect the condition of the king's defenses along the northern frontier. Viceroy Acuña's detailed instructions empowered Rivera to make recommendations regarding the defensive realignment and economic reorganization of all existing frontier presidios.

On November 21, 1724, General Rivera and his entourage departed Mexico City on an unprecedented three and a half-year inspection tour of the internal provinces, making Texas one of his final stops on the circuitous route. Rivera's vast military experience enabled him to quickly recognize the Rio Grande as a natural barrier to would-be intruders, both foreign and domestic. His first recommendation to the viceroy, then, was to place a cordon of presidios more or less in alignment with the meandering river. Second, and more specific to Big Bend, Rivera proposed the establishment of a new fortress on the west side of Texas somewhere between La Junta de los Rios and San Juan Bautista (across the Rio Grande near Eagle Pass, Texas).16

Intrigued with Rivera's observations, the Marques de Casafuerte promulgated a new directive in June 1728 to comply with the proposed improvements. Lack of funding required to implement the order, however, forced the viceroy to rescind the mandate until the following year. Nevertheless, the stated strategic importance of the Rio Grande called for a more in-depth investigation of the remote territories surrounding present Big Bend. The explorations, furthermore, would enable the Spanish to identify suitable locations for future defense installations.

The demands of such a task called for a soldier with extensive military experience and an impeccable reputation for responsible leadership. Don José de Berroteran, the veteran captain of Presidio San Francisco de los Conchos, seemed more than capable to meet the challenge. With ninety well-equipped soldiers and forty Indian auxiliaries, Berroteran set out in March 1729 in an attempt to follow the Rio Grande as far as La Junta. Making his way upstream to a point just south of present Dryden, Texas, the bewildered captain aborted his mission well short of completion because of extremely difficult terrain encountered throughout the journey.

Although severely criticized for his failure, Captain Berroteran defended himself, saying that the expedition was "frustrated from the beginning." If he had continued to follow the natural course of the river as instructed, he could never have overcome the imposing canyons that lay in his path; therefore, he elected not to undertake the challenge. Perhaps exasperated at his own faint-heartedness, Berroterán took some consolation in merely having returned from the "labyrinth"—a fitting description for the cavernous topography typical of the Big Bend region.17

While fiscal and administrative problems in Mexico City postponed the full implementation of the viceroy's directive for almost a decade, the recurring Apache problem generated increased concern among frontier administrators. Repeated complaints about unyielding Indian attacks along the border from the governor of Coahuila, Blas de la Garza Falcon, demanded official response. During the fall of 1735, the viceroy ordered Governor Garza Falcon to undertake a full expedition at his expense into the northern frontier to determine a good location for the much desired fortification. In the company of Captain Joseph Antonio de Eca y MtIzquiz, a soldier from Presidio San Juan Bautista, the military contingent left Monclova, Coahuila, and marched toward the Rio Grande.

According to viceregal instructions, Garza Falcon was to erect the proposed Presidio del Sacramento in the best possible location. Enduring bitter north winds and constant snow throughout the winter months of 1735 and 1736, the party moved sluggishly northeast until reaching a point fifteen miles south of present Del Rio, Texas. While the main body of soldiers elected to wait out the storms in camp, a smaller contingent, under the command of the governor's son, Miguel de la Garza Falcon, reconnoitered the land as far as the vicinity of Dryden's Crossing, a hundred miles northwest of the main encampment. Unable to continue on his prescribed course, the governor opted to build the presidio on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande where they had camped. On January 7, 1736, the Spaniards celebrated the selection of the new site on the San Diego River, a tributary of the Rio Grande. The following week, the Garza Falcon expedition returned home exhausted by their personal ordeal with inclement weather and inhospitable terrain.

Although the governor derived some personal satisfaction in his accomplishments, his superiors were not impressed with the choice of location for the presidio. One critic argued that Garza Falcon, not unlike other provincial administrators who wanted a new military installation in their jurisdiction, had greatly exaggerated the extent of the Indian problem in Coahuila. Further, the royal auditor contested that the new site was too close to an already established garrison in San Juan Bautista. He believed that Presidio del Sacramento would be more effective if it were moved to a more advantageous position closer to the Rio Grande. While he acquiesced to the presidio's construction, the court official was adamant that the post should not be permanent. In light of this critical but objective assessment, the search for a suitable fortification site along the Rio Grande became more imperative.18

In June 1747 the official rationale for a thorough investigation of Big Bend came in the form of a document submitted to the viceroy from the Marques de Altamira. The auditor of the Audiencia of Mexico rendered a thoughtful evaluation of the defensive posture of the Texas frontier. Citing national defense and the needs of the church as the basis for his argument, the colonial agent penned the following recommendations. First, he noted that not a single presidio existed between San Juan Bautista and El Paso del Norte, a distance of over three hundred and sixty leagues (approximately 540 miles). Second, a consequence of this oversight was that no regular missionary work could be carried on at La Junta, an area of considerable importance to the missionization effort in Texas. For these reasons, Altamira concluded that an exploration of Big Bend be undertaken simultaneously from various points along the Rio Grande. In conjunction with this effort, the auditor urged that a new fortification be established at a point which he considered to be the most strategically significant—La Junta de los Rios. The viceroy responded quickly and favorably to these suggestions. 19

According to his instructions, Governor Pedro Rábago y Terán of Coahuila prepared to assemble the first full-scale expedition to actually penetrate the heart of the Big Bend. Following a route similar to Berroterán's earlier excursion, the governor's party reached a point a few miles above Del Rio before turning due west toward Reagan Canyon. Unable to find a suitable crossing among the canyon's towering cliffs, the company moved steadily southwest until they located a good place to ford the Rio Grande into Texas. They named this place, situated a few miles above present Boquillas, Mexico, Santa Rita.

Hoping to avoid the perils that befell Berroterán in 1729, Rábago y Terán tried to follow the course of the river, but found the task virtually impossible because of the impassable canyons located on the Texas side. When faced with formidable obstacles such as Santa Elena Canyon, the judicious officer led his men around the natural barrier. On December 13 the party passed through the Chisos Mountains into the Terlingua Creek valley before crossing back into Mexico near present Lajitas, Texas. With fewer obstructions to contend with on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande, the expedition arrived in LaJunta one week before Christmas.20

Meanwhile, to comply with Akamira's proposed multiple exploration, Captains FermIn de Vidaurre of Presidio de MapimI and Joseph de Idyoga of San Bartolomé departed from different points in Mexico to converge upon La Junta, the latter arriving six days ahead of Rábago y Terán. Captain Idyoga gathered his contingent of troops from presidios San Bartolomé, San Francisco de los Conchos, and Cerro Gordo, all located in Chihuahua, and headed north along the Rio Conchos. At the village of San Antonio de Julimes the Spanish officer added several Indian auxiliaries and continued his journey to La Junta, arriving on November 22. Once settled, Idyoga initiated a thorough reconnaissance that included the first recorded census of the area.21

Soon after his arrival, Governor Rábago y Terán undertook a similar investigation of the territory east of Presidio, Texas, as far as Alamito Creek. His observations prompted the governor to instruct Captain Idyoga to build the presidio at La Junta "on either bank of the Rio Grande." In a follow-up report to the viceroy, Rábago y Terán listed several reasons for the decision. First, the presidio would restrain the Indians congregated around La Junta; second, it would impede Apache raids on Christianized Indians; third, it would enhance defensive communication with other military garrisons stationed along the Rio Grande; and fourth, its presence would offer protection and encourage commercial mining in the Big Bend. Captain Idyoga returned to San Francisco de los Conchos, however, before he could comply with the governor's orders.

For a full decade plans for the projected Presidio del Norte de La Junta de los Rios lay unattended in Mexico City. Finally, on October 5, 1759, Captain Rubin de Cells set out from Chihuahua with yet another expedition into the Big Bend. Celebrating their arrival at La Junta on Christmas Eve, the party next began to build the long-anticipated presidio. In July 1760 Captain Cells reported the completion of the project. The final placement of a fortress near the junction of the Rio Grande and the Rio Conchos brought to conclusion an episode in Spanish Colonial frontier history that had begun with the recommendations of Pedro de Rivera Villalon in 1729.22

While Spanish officials acknowledged the strategic importance of the Big Bend, recurring fiscal problems and bureaucratic indecisiveness precluded the placement of a presidio in that area. When increased Apache depredations forced the abandonment of the West Texas missions, however, the defense posture of La Junta de los Rios became a paramount concern in Mexico City. In Europe, meanwhile, France's loss to England in the Seven Years War forced a political realignment of her colonies on the North American continent. With the French threat removed from the Mississippi valley in 1763— the result of the Treaty of Paris —Spain felt free to reevaluate its defensive position along the Rio Grande. Thus, Presidio del Norte, as well as older military installations, figured prominently in a new bureaucratic reorganization effort designed to increase protection and improve defenses on the northern frontier.

If Spanish authorities were mindful of the need for a comprehensive assessment of military defenses in earlier years, the idea gained overwhelming support with the Bourbon reforms. In 1765 the viceroy issued a decree ordering the general inspection of all presidios on the frontier in an effort to evaluate their military preparedness. To complete this task he selected one of his most knowledgeable and faithful servants, Cayetano Maria Pignatelli, the Marques de Rubí. Field Marshal Rubí, an accomplished militarist, arrived in 1764 to accept the task of reorganizing Spanish military forces in the New World. His instructions were to evaluate not only the defensive capabilities of each of the existing twenty-four presidios but also determine their cost effectiveness.

In the company of Captain Nicolás de Lafora, a designer and construction officer in the Royal Corps of Engineers, Rubí began his seven thousand-mile trek from Mexico City in February 1766. During the three-year odyssey, the royal inspector visited every major Spanish fortification from California to Texas. Generally appalled at the deplorable state of the king's defenses, Rubl outlined his concerns in a final report dated May 4, 1768. In addition to preparing detailed maps of the journey, Lafora assessed local conditions and rendered suggestions as to the most strategic sites for the relocation of a number of presidios.23 Regarding Texas, Rubí found military conditions there seriously lacking, but noted that the presidios in that province were not unlike others encountered in northern New Spain. To begin, he rebuked Governor Joseph de Aguero of Chihuahua for his arbitrary decision to abandon Presidio del Norte in 1766. Rubí, in fact, was unable to conduct his inspection of that site because the governor had relocated the garrison at Pueblo de julimes, thirty miles farther west. Rubí reprimanded Aguero for his flagrant disregard of "the orders of the present viceroy by which he was instructed to act jointly with me in deciding upon the maintenance and removal of this presidio."24 The removal of troops from La Junta de los Rios, furthermore, left a sizeable defense gap on the Rio Grande. For this reason, Rubí insisted that the presidio be restored to its original location regardless of expense.

In addition to his recognition of La Junta as a vital defense link, Rubí made other observations in Texas affecting the future military disposition of the Big Bend. After an inspection of the presidio at San Sabá (near present Menard, Texas) in July 1767, the Marques declared the fortress obsolete, noting that it afforded "as much protection to the interests of His Majesty in New Spain as a ship anchored in the mid-Atlantic would afford in preventing foreign trade in America." Accordingly, Rubí ordered San Sabá and all of its troops transferred to a proposed new military post closer to the Rio Grande.

In his celebrated report of 1768, Rubí determined it a financial impossibility for Spain to provide a military garrison for every settlement located south of the Rio Grande. With this premise in mind, he proposed the erection of a cordon of presidios situated roughly along the natural course of the river. The northern frontier, he argued, should be viewed as a single defensive unit; therefore, some measure of continuity must be present in its fortification. Up to this time, presidios were haphazardly built with no regard for a well-defined military strategy. Based upon this assessment, Rubí proposed the reduction of the presidial line from twenty-four to fifteen well-placed units along the thirtieth parallel from the Gulf of California to the Guadalupe River in Texas. The forts would be placed an average of forty leagues (about a hundred miles) apart to facilitate better communication between defensive units.25

Clearly, the proposed realignment implied the transfer of some presidios along with the abandonment of others. Cognizant of the vast stretch of unprotected territory found among the unexplored canyons of the Big Bend, Rubí recommended the construction of two new outposts. First, the garrison from San Sabá would transfer immediately to a proposed site on the Rio Grande near San Vicente Pass. Concurrently, units from the recently abandoned post at Cerro Gordo (Chihuahua, Mexico) were to relocate forty leagues west of San Vicente at a new facility named Presidio San Carlos. Finally, the presidio in La Junta de los Rios must be reoccupied to complete the proposed defensive chain along the river.

The viceregal regulation issued on September 10, 1772, served as the legal embodiment for the Marques de Rubí's calculated recommendations. Divided into thirteen articles, these new laws had both a military and administrative purpose. While protection of lives and maintenance of frontier security remained the principal objective, efficient management of the presidios received equal attention. Therefore, the new legal code provided guidance for all military affairs ranging from payment of troops to the placement of a cordon of presidios along the thirtieth parallel. In response to Rubí's recommendations, the king's decree ordered the abandonment of San Sabá and the removal of its troops closer to the Rio Grande del Norte.

The reglamento further prescribed that the territory between the presidios of La Junta and San Juan Bautista be reconnoitered for the purpose of identifying appropriate locations to build the two new installations. "I order the said commandant of Nueva Vizcaya and the governor of Coahuila separately but at the same time to proceed to execute a reconnaissance of the area," the mandate read; "The commandant is to take the necessary troops and the companies from Julimes, Cerro Gordo, and San Sabá in order that with the first of the three restored to its old presidio of La Junta, the second [Cerro Gordo and San Sabá units] can be located in new presidios to be erected along the course of the Rio Grande." Appropriately, the field reports of Joseph de Berroterán and Pedro Rábago y Terán, along with Lafora's detailed maps of the area, provided guidance for one final entrada into the Big Bend.26

The orders for the proposed construction of presidios San Carlos and San Vicente brought to fruition nearly a half century of preparation and planning for the defense of the West Texas frontier. Clearly, Spain had full knowledge of the almost limitless boundaries to the north well in advance of the eighteenth century. For the most part, Spain viewed West Texas —in particular the Big Bend region—as a natural barrier to the settlement of more inviting colonies such as New Mexico.

As other European powers challenged Spain's unrivaled hegemony in the New World, the Texas frontier assumed greater strategic importance. Spain's reaction to the French presence in Louisiana occasioned plans to pacify the Rio Grande borderlands by traditional means— the mission and the presidio. As the cloud of foreign intervention momentarily subsided in 1763, Spain committed its military defenses and limited financial resources to the ultimate pacification of the Indian on the northern frontier. Critical elements to the proposed Spanish line of defense in West Texas, the newly established presidios at San Carlos and San Vicente received increased attention in Mexico City during the ensuing decades.