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| Joseph Smith: The Making of a Prophet |
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Is This What Is Meant by Academic Discourse? D. Michael Quinn's critique of recent biographies of Joseph Smith (Journal of Mormon History, Summer 2006, 232-39) demonstrated hostility toward historians who view the Mormon founder naturalistically. In apologizing for "so many criticisms" of my book, Joseph Smith: The Making of a Prophet, Quinn reported that I "encouraged [him] to express publicly [his] critique in the interest of academic discourse" (232n8). While this is true, it should not was not a concession to anything Quinn wrote. I appreciated his statement that my biography "deservedly won the Mormon History Association's best-book award" (238), but not what I consider to be a superficial reading and an ad hominem approach. He acknowledged that some of my interpretations were "nuanced" (234) but then critiqued them as if they were not. His analysis was idiosyncratic and seemed more preoccupied with defending his own previous judgments than with meaningful and substantive critique of my views. The fallacy of "possible distortion" Obviously, Quinn wants to appeal to the perceived biases of his audience and thereby "poison the well," which attempts to "discredit the source of an argument or point of view in such a way that it precludes any need to consider the merit of that position. In other words, it "damns the source," so that nothing that comes from the source will be or can be regarded as worthy of serious consideration."1 This tactic is also ad hominem, because it attempts to sidestep a criticism or argument by focusing on that person's special circumstances, bias, or improper motives. Despite Quinn's attempt to privilege the interpretations of believers, his argument is fallacious because it rests on the mere possibility of distortion.2 Tu quoque and shifting the burden of proof Contrary to Quinn's assertion, my skepticism does not rest on an automatic exclusion of the paranormal but on my assessment of "the evidence upon which such claims rest" (xii; emphasis added). The balance of my statement in my book is more explicit: "I do not claim that the supernatural does not exist, for it is impossible to prove a negative" (Ibid.). Admittedly I tend to view such claims with suspicion until shown otherwise, and I acknowledge that human beings are not in a good position to be able to assess the validity of paranormal claims. Revelations and visions are subjective. In contrast, translations of ancient texts are subject to historical analysis and verification. My skepticism about some of Joseph Smith's metaphysical claims stems primarily, but not exclusively, from my conclusion that the Book of Mormon is not an authentic ancient document, which is quite evident from my lengthy analysis of its contents. Quinn might disagree with my conclusion, but this evidence, which Quinn does not consider, and my interpretation of it are neither tautological nor dogmatic. Quinn on metaphysical reality Similarly, Quinn says that I "attack … arguments for 'intelligent design' in biological evolution" (233), which obscures the true nature of my discussion. I was rejecting what "is known to philosophers as the teleological argument for God's existence or 'argument from design'" (235). This was in response to Alma's argument that "all things denote there is a God; yea, even the earth, and all things that are upon the face of it, yea, and its motion, yea, and also all the planets which move in their regular form do witness that there is a Supreme Creator" (Alma 30:44). I considered the structure of this centuries-old argument, which Quinn avoided by appealing to contemporary popular versions of it. Quinn also cites my rejection of "remote viewing," or the ability to perceive things at great distances using only the mind, without considering my source notes. He implies that remote viewing has some legitimacy because it "has been used by both the military and the CIA" (233). However, he is apparently unaware that the U.S. government discontinued its study of remote viewing at the end of the Cold War with the announcement that it had been "unpromising" (see documentation in 592n13). One should not ignore serious research and simply appeal to popular mythology and claim one is engaging in scholarly discourse. Again, Quinn appeals to common misconceptions when he complains that I reject "the nearly metaphysical dimensions of quantum mechanics" (233). Ironically, this was the very misconception I was trying to correct in my endnote (570n39). If Quinn had consulted this source, he might have learned that the part of quantum theory Quinn calls "nearly metaphysical" is the unknown, yet to be discovered aspect of the theory and that any conclusions about the nature of reality based thereon rest on incomplete information. Quinn fails to meet my analysis of the topic on the level it deserves and is merely satisfied with what he has gleaned from popular misconceptions. A superficial reading Again, Quinn accuses me of being disingenuous because I believe Joseph Smith was a "'pious fraud' who made 'a conscious decision to deceive' through 'nefarious means'" while at the same time claiming that I do not want to "judge him" (234, quoting from x, xii). I used "nefarious" in regard to Smith's activities as a treasure seer, which bore little or no relationship to Christian piety. Nevertheless, in my view, arguing that some of Smith's activities as a prophet were fraudulent is not to judge him. I have not said he was evil or immoral; my point is that he was a morally complex person who had a sincere faith and pious motives. Quinn finds other "perplexing" statements (234), but they are easily resolved by a more careful reading. For example, he puzzles over why I would say "Joseph had not been concerned about which church was true in 1818" (60) but, on the next page, write that "at age twelve [December 1817], he had concluded that members of the various sects 'did not adorn their profession by a holy walk and godly conversation agreeable to what I found contained in that sacred depository' [the Bible]" (61). One can certainly see all Christendom as corrupt and apostate without worrying that one's personal salvation depends on membership in a particular church. Quinn's partial quotation leaves out my qualification that Smith's denominational concern was not yet fully developed, "at least not to the extent that he was [concerned about it] in 1824-25" (60). About this time, as I explained, his mother and three siblings joined the Presbyterian Church and began pressuring other family members to join. In this environment, concern over church membership became "desperately important" (60), especially considering what it implied about the deceased and unbaptized Alvin. Other than noting what he thought was a discrepancy, Quinn gives no indication that he grasps the significance of my overall discussion of the first vision, which was seen as an important element of my book by at least one other reviewer.4 Quinn sees it as contradictory to deny "the literal reality of the testimony of Eight Witnesses" while mentioning that "Hyrum Smith privately affirmed that he 'handled them [the plates] with his hands'" (234, quoting 672-73n5). A more careful reading would have resolved Quinn's puzzlement. After reviewing several sources, including John Whitmer's statement that the plates were shown to him by "supernatural power," I made the following observation: "If the eight witnesses viewed the plates through the lid of the box, … [then] each of the men could claim that they had 'seen and hefted' the plates …" (469). Quinn sees further discrepancy when I "paradoxically state" that Hyrum's handling the plates was "'not unlike' seeing the plates 'in vision'" (234). However, Quinn did not quote Hyrum's complete statement from my endnote. In the balance of it, Hyrum reportedly said "he had but two hands and two eyes" and that "he had seen the plates with his eyes and handled them with his hands" (672n5), to which I argued that he "was not necessarily denying dissenter claims that he and the other witness had seen the plates in vision" since his statement was "not unlike the response of David Whitmer, who in 1886 told Nathan Tanner … 'There is no doubt that our eyes were prepared for the sight, but they were our natural eyes nevertheless'" (673-74n5; words in italics quoted by Quinn). My comments therefore pertain to the seeing aspect of Hyrum's statement and would only seem incomplete to someone who did not carefully read my complete presentation. Again, Quinn seems preoccupied with finding discrepancies and bypassing serious discussion of content. The camp meeting and selective quoting
Thus, the revival that did not happen in 1820 was the one that Joseph Smith said involved Lucy Smith's conversion to Presbyterianism, a point that Quinn has elsewhere conceded.5 Quinn doesn't understand that my analysis is primarily textual and stems from fundamental differences between Smith's 1832 and 1838 accounts. The problem is much bigger than whether Smith could experience a "revival camp meeting" near Palmyra in 1820. Absent from Smith's 1832 account is his confusion over which sect to join that motivated his 1820 prayer; he had already concluded that all were apostate from reading his Bible. There is also no mention of a revival. In 1838, the revival of 1824-25 is added to the story, along with Smith's confusion about which church to join. The content of the vision also changes, with Smith asking Deity which church is true and the parenthetical statement that "at this time it had never entered into my heart that all [churches] were wrong" (cf. 60). My point, which Quinn obscures, was that the revival and the concern over which church to join is anachronistic to the first vision story, which renders debate about a "camp-meeting" in June 1820 in the "vicinity" of Palmyra irrelevant to my discussion. Quinn takes me to task for not following his own idiosyncratic adjustments to traditional chronology, which result from his uncritical acceptance of faulty sources. As early as 1994, I dealt with Quinn's chronological errors.6 I also responded to his very convoluted defenses in 2000 and 2002, although he cited neither.7 He further complains that I am "unwilling to admit the evidence that Joseph was a treasure seer with a seer stone as early as 1819-20, which requires [Vogel] to ignore or dispute the testimony of Smith's neighbors" (236). However, Quinn's claim rests on Pomeroy Tucker's 1867 unattributed, garbled, and problematic statement.8 According to Tucker,
This account conflicts with Willard Chase's 1833 statement that the stone was discovered while digging a well on his family's property in 1822, not 1819.10 Tucker's description of the stone is also inaccurate. While the shape and size of the stone is correct, it was not white but brown. Quinn speculates that Tucker mixed the details from the discovery of different stones: a white stone in 1819 and a brown one in 1822. Given the nature of Quinn's "evidence," his assertion that I "ignore or dispute the testimony of Smith's neighbors" is grossly exaggerated. My fault is only in disputing Quinn's speculative reconstruction, where he stands alone against other historians, which is not the same as disputing Smith's "neighbors." As I mentioned in an endnote (583n20), it is a mistake to place too much confidence in Tucker's dating and other details.11 Thus biographer Richard Bushman wisely states that "the source of the other stone is uncertain."12 Similarly, Quinn complains that I am "unwilling to accept the evidence that Joseph was active in the treasure quest along the Susquehanna River in 1821-24, which requires him to ignore or dispute the narratives of Russell C. Doud and William R. Hine that they worked with Smith in the treasure quest near the Susquehanna River as early as 1821 for an employer who died in May 1824" (236). Doud's statement, which comes to us second-hand, mentions working for Oliver Harper, a resident of Windsor, New York, but adds that Joseph Smith was not present. For his part, Hine failed to mention Harper. These sources are discussed in more detail below. Quinn presents his supposition as historical fact and seems unaware that in Early Mormon Documents (hereafter EMD), Vol. 4, I responded to his nontraditional chronology and dated Smith's introduction to this area to about November 1825.13 Again, Quinn relies on two problematic sources, which "requires him to ignore or dispute" more reliable testimony. According to Hine, who was about two years older than Joseph Jr., Joseph's "father told me he [the son] was fifteen years old" at the time (EMD 4:183), which would put Joseph Smith in the Colesville area in 1820-21. In 2002, I advised that "Hine's [1885] statement should be approached with caution since it makes many claims contrary to established chronology and history" (EMD 4:181). One glaring mistake is that he claims he heard the text of the stolen 116-page manuscript read about the time his daughter Irene was born, which was in 1825 (EMD 4:186n30). Apparently, Hine's chronology is behind about three years. Hine claimed Smith dug for silver on "Monument Hill," located near Colesville in the northern section of Windsor Township, in an excavation sponsored by Asa Stowell, a relative of Josiah Stowell (EMD 4:183nn11-13). However, according to Josiah's testimony at the March 1826 court hearing, Smith had directed digging at this location during the previous five months and not previously (EMD 4:251). Further complicating Hine's account is his claim that Joseph's seer stone was "very clear … [and] about the size and shape of a duck's egg" and that "Jo claimed it was found in digging a well in Palmyra, N.Y. He said he borrowed it" (EMD 4:182), which would tend to date his confused observations to at least after 1822 (EMD 4:183n7). It's puzzling that Quinn places so much confidence in Hine's dating when other chronological details in his 1885 statement are demonstrably wrong. R. C. Doud's statement was reported in Emily Blackman's 1873 History of Susquehanna County, who at the same time noted that there was a "difference of opinion in regard to Joe's first operations in Susquehanna County" (EMD 4:395; emphasis added). According to Blackman,
Quinn's statement that Doud "worked with Smith" is misleading since Doud admitted the youngster "was not present at the time." Although Blackman did not report the grounds on which Doud made his "assert[ion]," she labeled it an "opinion" and evidently did not consider it credible enugh to resolve the conflicting dates. Emma Smith's cousins, Joseph and Hiel Lewis, reported that digging in Harmony began under the direction of a seeress named Odle (4:301), and Doud may have simply assumed that Smith had always directed the diggers. Regardless, Doud's "opinion" and "assert[ion]" hardly amount to "evidence that Joseph was active in the treasure quest along the Susquehanna River in 1821-24," let alone as the basis for unqualified criticism of me, and by extension Richard Bushman, for ignoring it. Grand conspiracies
This was in support of my discussion about the three successive money-digging companies that worked in Harmony from about 1822 to 1825 (72). Obviously, Doud's statement about himself is perfectly valid, while his hearsay opinion of Joseph Smith's involvement is questionable. In the further quest to find evidence that naturalists are dogmatists who participate in "the concealment of uncomfortable evidence" (239), Quinn goes so far as to cite the absence of "Doud" in my "otherwise exhaustive index" (237). First, my index is not "otherwise exhaustive" (and neither are his); and second, there would be no purpose in concealing a "heavily edited quotation." Quinn goes from silly to ridiculous when he then tries to explain my true motivations for rejecting or ignoring his novel chronology:
This could not be more incorrect or provide greater evidence that Quinn gave my book a hasty review. Although I believe the 1824-25 revival was inserted anachronistically into the 1820 setting and the first vision story has undergone revision, I clearly state:
Later I revisit the first vision:
Statements like these directly contradict Quinn's attempt to convince readers that I am eradicating all forms of metaphysical experience from Joseph Smith's life. It is puzzling to see Quinn fret over an entry in my index but miss major statements like these. In reviewing my book, William D. Russell was able to distinguish my position from that of the Reverend Wesley P. Walters: "The moderate Vogel offers a middle ground which I think believing Mormons are foolish to reject as without merit."15 Apparently, Quinn cannot. A self-promoting complaint
While this late source dates the visitation of Peter, James, and John to 1830, it does not help in dating it to "after the new church's organization" (237) and therefore was not pertinent to my discussion, just as it was not to Bushman's. No-fault apologetics
First, Quinn's statement begs the question since he assumes what he concludes—that a "translator-reviser" would produce a "translated-revised document." Second, he does not explain how his theory can accommodate the observations of naturalistic biographers who, according to Bushman, have "account[ed] for virtually every character and every event [in the Book of Mormon] by locating precedents in Joseph's personal history."18 Apparently Quinn borrows his "translated-revised" hypothesis from Blake Ostler's expansion theory,16 which posits that Smith added his own inspired commentary as he translated the original ancient text. It works like this: whatever nineteenth-century parallels in the Book of Mormon can't be neutralized, either in full or in part, by an ancient parallel is Joseph Smith's inspired expansion or commentary. Since publication in 1987, Ostler's theory has not be used in any serious interpretive endeavor, but has been occasionally offered merely as a convenient impediment to the question of historicity by moving it into the realm of the untestable and unfalsifiable. Even at that, Quinn's attempt to accommodating the naturalists' interpretations under the rubric of "revised" seems to push the theory beyond the breaking point. Quinn's statement therefore seems more like a rhetorical flourish than a viable solution to conflicting interpretations. Conclusion 1T. Edward Damer, Attacking Faulty Reasoning: A Practical Guide to Fallacy-Free Arguments, 4th ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth/Thompson Learning, 2001), 174-76. |
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